DID YOU KNOW THAT A JUDGE WILL DECIDE WHO HAS CUSTODY OF YOUR CHILD BY LOOKING AA LAW CALLED "Best interests of the child. "
For more information go to http://www.attorneybankert.com
The best interests of the child is the standard used in custody disputes between parents, agencies, and third parties.
The court must consider each factor and make findings on the record.
The factors need not have equal weight; the court determines the weight of each factor.
to move fast on yoru cutody issue or divorce see http://www.dumpmyspouse.com
Best interest factors Factors used in Bay City Divorce and through out Michigan.
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. This factor focuses on the emotional bond that already exists between the parent and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any. This factor tries to project the parent’s ability to foster an emotional bond in the future, and the parent’s impact on such matters as education, guidance, and religious training.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. This factor focuses solely on the permanence of the family environment, not the acceptability of the home or child care arrangements.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved. This factor evaluates the parties’ moral fitness only as it relates to how they will function as a parent and not as to who is the morally superior adult.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved. This factor should not impair or defeat the public policy goal of integrating disabled persons into the mainstream of society.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference. The court must take the preference of the child into account if it decides that the child is old enough to express a preference. The court is not required to disclose the child’s preference. The child’s preference does not automatically outweigh other factors; it is only one element used to make the determination.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
( l ) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute. The court may not consider the race of a parent’s spouse in considering whether to change custody.
Sole or joint custody. §§3.21–3.22.
Joint custody means that the parents have joint physical custody (the child resides for alternate periods with each parent) and/or that the parents have joint legal custody (the parents share decision-making authority on important decisions affecting the child’s welfare).
In a joint custody arrangement, the order determining custody or parenting time must contain a provision stating the parents’ agreement on how they will handle a change in either of the child’s legal residences that is more than 100 miles from the child’s residence at the time the action was filed. If the parents do not agree on such a provision, the order must state: “A parent whose custody or parenting time of a child is governed by this order shall not change the legal residence of the child except in compliance with section 11 of the ‘Child Custody Act of 1970,’ 1970 PA 91, MCL 722.31.”
.ANY PEOPLE IN DIVORCE ALSO HAVE FINANCIAL HARDSHIP AND LOOK TO BAY CITY BANKRUTPCY. We know that its www.nojokebeingbroke.com
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Friday, May 28, 2010
BAY AREA VALUATION OF DISPUTED ASSETS
SAGINAW DIVORCE REVIEWED BY ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT A DIVORCE LAWYER. For immediate help with your family law questions call 810-235-1970.
THE SAGINAW DIVORCE VALUE OF DISPUTED ASSETS CASE
CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
(This opinion has been modified for media presentation)
To see original document, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/opinions/final/coa/20100504_c288923_61_288923opn.pdf
SAAD, J.
Plaintiff Cheri Woodington appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce. She argues that the trial court made inadequate findings of fact in regard to the value of marital property, the date of valuation, and the status of certain assets as marital or separate property. She also raises issues concerning discovery, spousal support, and attorney fees. Defendant Kamran Shokoohi cross-appeals and contends that the trial court erred in failing to divide the property in accordance with the parties’ prenuptial agreement. We affirm some aspects of the trial court’s judgment; however, because the inadequacy of the trial court’s findings on several of these matters precludes meaningful appellate review, we remand for further proceedings.
IV. TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF VALUE OF DISPUTED ASSETS
Absent a prenuptial agreement, the trial court should equitably distribute marital property in light of all the circumstances. Berger, 277 Mich App at 716-717. To reach an equitable division of marital property, the trial court should consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and needs, fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance. McDougal, 451 Mich at 89; Sparks, 440 Mich at 158-160. The determination of relevant factors will vary with the circumstances of each case, and no one factor should be given undue weight. The trial court must make specific findings regarding the factors it determines to be relevant. Sparks, 440 Mich at 159; Berger, 277 Mich App at 717.
Generally, marital assets are subject to division between the parties but the parties’ separate assets may not be invaded. McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183. Generally, assets earned by a spouse during the marriage, whether they are received during the existence of the marriage or after the judgment of divorce, are properly considered part of the marital estate. Skelly v Skelly, 286 Mich App 578, 582; ___ NW2d ___ (2009); McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183-184 . The parties’ manifestation of intent to lead separate lives, such as by filing a complaint for divorce or maintaining separate homes, can be of crucial significance when apportioning the marital estate. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 112; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). However, property earned after such a manifestation of intent should still be considered a marital asset, although the presumption of congruence that exists with respect to the distribution of marital assets becomes attenuated and may result in the non-acquiring spouse being entitled to no share or a lesser share of the property in light of all the apportionment factors. Byington, 224 Mich App at 115-116. Separate assets may be invaded if one party demonstrates additional need, or had significantly contributed to the acquisition or growth of the separate asset. Skelly, 286 Mich App at 582.
A trial court must make specific findings of fact regarding the value of each disputed piece of marital property awarded to each party in the judgment. Olson, 256 Mich App at 627- 628. A trial court’s findings of fact are inadequate if they are not sufficiently specific to enable the parties to determine the approximate values of their individual awards by consulting the verdict along with the valuations to which they stipulated. Nalevayko v Nalevayko, 198 Mich App 163, 164; 497 NW2d 533 (1993). For the purposes of dividing property, marital assets are typically valued at the time of trial or the time judgment is entered, although the court may, in its discretion, use a different date. Byington, 224 Mich App at 114 n 4.
This Court further reviews whether the trial court’s dispositional rulings are fair and equitable in light of the trial court's findings of fact, Sparks, 440 Mich at 151-152, but this Court will reverse only if definitely and firmly convinced that the disposition is inequitable. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 7. When dividing marital property, the court is not required to award mathematically precise shares. Byington, 224 Mich App at 114-115.
Here, the trial court did not divide the marital estate on a percentage basis, nor did it explain its general basis for determining an equitable division of property. It did not make findings regarding the parties’ contributions to the marital estate or other relevant factors for property division. The trial court awarded defendant the bulk of the marital estate, and awarded plaintiff personal possessions, such as her vehicle, and the children’s furniture, and awarded plaintiff one of the parties’ homes, and a property award in the form of alimony in gross. Plaintiff specifically challenges the trial court’s failure to make findings concerning the value of certain assets, and generally challenges the trial court’s failure to make findings concerning its overall property division.
We are unable to discern the trial court’s general plan in dividing assets. Defendant argues that the division can be explained in reference to the prenuptial agreement, but the trial court found that the parties did not make the agreement in contemplation of divorce. (Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to comply with the prenuptial agreement is addressed below.) Despite this statement, the trial court’s division of property is substantially consistent with the prenuptial agreement’s requirement that property acquired after the marriage “shall be divided . . . according to the percentage of their respective contributions in acquiring same.” It appears that the trial court regarded the marital assets as the product of defendant’s contributions and awarded them accordingly, allowing plaintiff only six years of support payments and assets such as the vacation home and vehicle that could be considered “her” own property. The trial court’s failure to make findings in support of its uneven property division raises questions regarding why it ordered a property division in near compliance with a prenuptial agreement it found to be inapplicable. Furthermore, it appears that the trial court’s decision may have been based on the unstated premise that defendant was the primary contributor to the marital estate. Although plaintiff’s financial contributions to the marital estate are negligible, it is well established that a non-earning spouse can make substantial contributions to the marital estate by running the household and caring for the parties’ children. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 293; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). Plaintiff, a lawyer, quit her law practice and suspended her legal career to stay at home with the parties’ children. She also testified that she devoted substantial energy and time to serving the needs of defendant and his family. The trial court’s failure to make relevant findings on this matter precludes meaningful review of whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, and on whether its division of property constituted an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, we agree with plaintiff that the trial court failed to make findings regarding these assets:
2007 Yukon. The parties gave conflicting testimony concerning the value of this vehicle, but the trial court failed to make a finding as its value, and failed to explain if or why it considered the vehicle plaintiff’s separate property.
Saginaw Federal Credit Union account and Chase Bank account, No ****0175. Defendant withdrew $100,000 from the credit union account in June 2006, the month plaintiff filed for divorce, and deposited this amount into the Chase account. Defendant did not account for how these funds were disseminated after their transfer to the Chase account. In December 2007, defendant deposited his employee bonus, in the amount of $148,875, into the credit union account. The trial court awarded both of these accounts to defendant, without making relevant findings. Given the questionable circumstances of money being withdrawn from the parties’ joint account at the time plaintiff filed for divorce, and being transferred to another account that was nearly depleted over the following months, the trial court erred in failing to make findings as to the value of these accounts. The trial court’s decision in regard to these accounts is problematic because there are no findings of fact that support the trial court’s decision. The court made no findings as to the parties’ contributions, etc., that would explain why the award is so favorable to defendant. The court’s decision appears to conform to the prenuptial agreement, but the court found that the agreement was not made in contemplation of divorce. The trial court’s decision to award these accounts to defendant without making findings regarding the transactions seems to assume that defendant was entitled to dissipate the $100,000 transferred out of the credit union without explanation, and that he was entitled to keep as his separate property the 2007 bonus payment of $143,875. Property acquired after the parties manifest an intent to lead separate lives is not necessarily excluded from the marital estate. The court should consider this matter pursuant to relevant factors, such as the parties’ respective contributions to the spouse’s compensation package. Byington, 224 Mich App at 117 . Regarding the credit union withdrawal, when a party has dissipated marital assets without the fault of the other spouse, the value of the dissipated assets may be included in the marital estate. 2 Michigan Family Law (2008 supp), Property Division, § 15.21. But the trial court made no findings to explain its decisions regarding these accounts, or its overall plan for dividing the marital estate.
Defendant’s 401(k) account with the P.C. The trial court’s minimal findings of fact concerning the marital estate in general, and several specific assets, including this account, leave us unable to determine whether its decisions were an abuse of discretion, or whether they were based on clearly erroneous findings of fact.
Mercedes. Defendant argues that the Mercedes is not marital property because he acquired through a “reinvestment” of an asset listed as a separate asset in the prenuptial agreement; plaintiff rejects this characterization. The trial court failed to make findings regarding the value of the Mercedes and its status as marital property.
We do not, however, share plaintiff’s view that the trial court failed to make relevant findings regarding the Chemical Bank Primevest Account. Defendant held this account jointly with his sister. The trial court awarded defendant “the value of potential interest should sister predecease Defendant.” This statement indicates that the trial court found that the account belonged primarily to defendant’s sister, and was not a marital asset. This finding is not clearly erroneous as it is supported by defendant’s testimony, which the trial court was free to find credible.
Notwithstanding the Chemical Bank account, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to make findings as to the relevant factors for property division, and its failure to assign a value to several assets (or to determine the appropriate date for valuation), leave this Court and the parties unable to assess whether the marital division was equitable. This problem is further complicated by the trial court’s issuance of a property division that is substantially compliant with a prenuptial agreement that the trial court found was not made in contemplation of divorce.
Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for adequate findings of fact.
Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
see
[1]
CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
[2]
CAP HEADLINES OR (trb)
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
MISC
FOOTNOTES
1 Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 566; 616 NW2d 219 (2000). We note that the holding in Staple is inapplicable because Staple applies “to judgments entered pursuant to the parties’ own negotiated settlement agreements, not to alimony provisions of a judgment entered after an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 569.
THE SAGINAW DIVORCE VALUE OF DISPUTED ASSETS CASE
CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
(This opinion has been modified for media presentation)
To see original document, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/opinions/final/coa/20100504_c288923_61_288923opn.pdf
SAAD, J.
Plaintiff Cheri Woodington appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce. She argues that the trial court made inadequate findings of fact in regard to the value of marital property, the date of valuation, and the status of certain assets as marital or separate property. She also raises issues concerning discovery, spousal support, and attorney fees. Defendant Kamran Shokoohi cross-appeals and contends that the trial court erred in failing to divide the property in accordance with the parties’ prenuptial agreement. We affirm some aspects of the trial court’s judgment; however, because the inadequacy of the trial court’s findings on several of these matters precludes meaningful appellate review, we remand for further proceedings.
IV. TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF VALUE OF DISPUTED ASSETS
Absent a prenuptial agreement, the trial court should equitably distribute marital property in light of all the circumstances. Berger, 277 Mich App at 716-717. To reach an equitable division of marital property, the trial court should consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age, health and needs, fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance. McDougal, 451 Mich at 89; Sparks, 440 Mich at 158-160. The determination of relevant factors will vary with the circumstances of each case, and no one factor should be given undue weight. The trial court must make specific findings regarding the factors it determines to be relevant. Sparks, 440 Mich at 159; Berger, 277 Mich App at 717.
Generally, marital assets are subject to division between the parties but the parties’ separate assets may not be invaded. McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183. Generally, assets earned by a spouse during the marriage, whether they are received during the existence of the marriage or after the judgment of divorce, are properly considered part of the marital estate. Skelly v Skelly, 286 Mich App 578, 582; ___ NW2d ___ (2009); McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183-184 . The parties’ manifestation of intent to lead separate lives, such as by filing a complaint for divorce or maintaining separate homes, can be of crucial significance when apportioning the marital estate. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 112; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). However, property earned after such a manifestation of intent should still be considered a marital asset, although the presumption of congruence that exists with respect to the distribution of marital assets becomes attenuated and may result in the non-acquiring spouse being entitled to no share or a lesser share of the property in light of all the apportionment factors. Byington, 224 Mich App at 115-116. Separate assets may be invaded if one party demonstrates additional need, or had significantly contributed to the acquisition or growth of the separate asset. Skelly, 286 Mich App at 582.
A trial court must make specific findings of fact regarding the value of each disputed piece of marital property awarded to each party in the judgment. Olson, 256 Mich App at 627- 628. A trial court’s findings of fact are inadequate if they are not sufficiently specific to enable the parties to determine the approximate values of their individual awards by consulting the verdict along with the valuations to which they stipulated. Nalevayko v Nalevayko, 198 Mich App 163, 164; 497 NW2d 533 (1993). For the purposes of dividing property, marital assets are typically valued at the time of trial or the time judgment is entered, although the court may, in its discretion, use a different date. Byington, 224 Mich App at 114 n 4.
This Court further reviews whether the trial court’s dispositional rulings are fair and equitable in light of the trial court's findings of fact, Sparks, 440 Mich at 151-152, but this Court will reverse only if definitely and firmly convinced that the disposition is inequitable. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 7. When dividing marital property, the court is not required to award mathematically precise shares. Byington, 224 Mich App at 114-115.
Here, the trial court did not divide the marital estate on a percentage basis, nor did it explain its general basis for determining an equitable division of property. It did not make findings regarding the parties’ contributions to the marital estate or other relevant factors for property division. The trial court awarded defendant the bulk of the marital estate, and awarded plaintiff personal possessions, such as her vehicle, and the children’s furniture, and awarded plaintiff one of the parties’ homes, and a property award in the form of alimony in gross. Plaintiff specifically challenges the trial court’s failure to make findings concerning the value of certain assets, and generally challenges the trial court’s failure to make findings concerning its overall property division.
We are unable to discern the trial court’s general plan in dividing assets. Defendant argues that the division can be explained in reference to the prenuptial agreement, but the trial court found that the parties did not make the agreement in contemplation of divorce. (Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to comply with the prenuptial agreement is addressed below.) Despite this statement, the trial court’s division of property is substantially consistent with the prenuptial agreement’s requirement that property acquired after the marriage “shall be divided . . . according to the percentage of their respective contributions in acquiring same.” It appears that the trial court regarded the marital assets as the product of defendant’s contributions and awarded them accordingly, allowing plaintiff only six years of support payments and assets such as the vacation home and vehicle that could be considered “her” own property. The trial court’s failure to make findings in support of its uneven property division raises questions regarding why it ordered a property division in near compliance with a prenuptial agreement it found to be inapplicable. Furthermore, it appears that the trial court’s decision may have been based on the unstated premise that defendant was the primary contributor to the marital estate. Although plaintiff’s financial contributions to the marital estate are negligible, it is well established that a non-earning spouse can make substantial contributions to the marital estate by running the household and caring for the parties’ children. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 293; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). Plaintiff, a lawyer, quit her law practice and suspended her legal career to stay at home with the parties’ children. She also testified that she devoted substantial energy and time to serving the needs of defendant and his family. The trial court’s failure to make relevant findings on this matter precludes meaningful review of whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, and on whether its division of property constituted an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, we agree with plaintiff that the trial court failed to make findings regarding these assets:
2007 Yukon. The parties gave conflicting testimony concerning the value of this vehicle, but the trial court failed to make a finding as its value, and failed to explain if or why it considered the vehicle plaintiff’s separate property.
Saginaw Federal Credit Union account and Chase Bank account, No ****0175. Defendant withdrew $100,000 from the credit union account in June 2006, the month plaintiff filed for divorce, and deposited this amount into the Chase account. Defendant did not account for how these funds were disseminated after their transfer to the Chase account. In December 2007, defendant deposited his employee bonus, in the amount of $148,875, into the credit union account. The trial court awarded both of these accounts to defendant, without making relevant findings. Given the questionable circumstances of money being withdrawn from the parties’ joint account at the time plaintiff filed for divorce, and being transferred to another account that was nearly depleted over the following months, the trial court erred in failing to make findings as to the value of these accounts. The trial court’s decision in regard to these accounts is problematic because there are no findings of fact that support the trial court’s decision. The court made no findings as to the parties’ contributions, etc., that would explain why the award is so favorable to defendant. The court’s decision appears to conform to the prenuptial agreement, but the court found that the agreement was not made in contemplation of divorce. The trial court’s decision to award these accounts to defendant without making findings regarding the transactions seems to assume that defendant was entitled to dissipate the $100,000 transferred out of the credit union without explanation, and that he was entitled to keep as his separate property the 2007 bonus payment of $143,875. Property acquired after the parties manifest an intent to lead separate lives is not necessarily excluded from the marital estate. The court should consider this matter pursuant to relevant factors, such as the parties’ respective contributions to the spouse’s compensation package. Byington, 224 Mich App at 117 . Regarding the credit union withdrawal, when a party has dissipated marital assets without the fault of the other spouse, the value of the dissipated assets may be included in the marital estate. 2 Michigan Family Law (2008 supp), Property Division, § 15.21. But the trial court made no findings to explain its decisions regarding these accounts, or its overall plan for dividing the marital estate.
Defendant’s 401(k) account with the P.C. The trial court’s minimal findings of fact concerning the marital estate in general, and several specific assets, including this account, leave us unable to determine whether its decisions were an abuse of discretion, or whether they were based on clearly erroneous findings of fact.
Mercedes. Defendant argues that the Mercedes is not marital property because he acquired through a “reinvestment” of an asset listed as a separate asset in the prenuptial agreement; plaintiff rejects this characterization. The trial court failed to make findings regarding the value of the Mercedes and its status as marital property.
We do not, however, share plaintiff’s view that the trial court failed to make relevant findings regarding the Chemical Bank Primevest Account. Defendant held this account jointly with his sister. The trial court awarded defendant “the value of potential interest should sister predecease Defendant.” This statement indicates that the trial court found that the account belonged primarily to defendant’s sister, and was not a marital asset. This finding is not clearly erroneous as it is supported by defendant’s testimony, which the trial court was free to find credible.
Notwithstanding the Chemical Bank account, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to make findings as to the relevant factors for property division, and its failure to assign a value to several assets (or to determine the appropriate date for valuation), leave this Court and the parties unable to assess whether the marital division was equitable. This problem is further complicated by the trial court’s issuance of a property division that is substantially compliant with a prenuptial agreement that the trial court found was not made in contemplation of divorce.
Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for adequate findings of fact.
Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
see
[1]
CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
[2]
CAP HEADLINES OR (trb)
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
MISC
FOOTNOTES
1 Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 566; 616 NW2d 219 (2000). We note that the holding in Staple is inapplicable because Staple applies “to judgments entered pursuant to the parties’ own negotiated settlement agreements, not to alimony provisions of a judgment entered after an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 569.
Sunday, March 7, 2010
MEDIATION
Mediation; arbitration.
by Terry Ray Bankert a Flint Divorce Lawyer Attorney
KNOW YOUR CUSTODY,SUPPORT AND DIVORCE RIGHTS. Michigan Divorce Lawyer , Custody and support.
Friend of the Court mediation.
Must be provided for custody and parenting time disputes; optional use by the parties.
Court rule mediation.
The court may refer any contested issue to mediation, but parties who are subject to personal protection orders or who are involved in child abuse or neglect proceedings may not be referred to mediation without a hearing.
Referral to mediation—by stipulation, a party’s written motion, or the court’s own motion.
Objection to mediation—within 14 days after notice of an order assigning the matter to mediation, by motion and notice of a hearing. The motion must be heard within 14 days unless the court orders otherwise, but it must be heard before the case is submitted to mediation.
Private mediation.
On the parties’ stipulation, the court may order private mediation.
Arbitration.
The parties may agree in writing to resolve property, custody, and child support issues. Having agreed, the parties are bound by the decision. The court may vacate the award if
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means
there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights
the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers
the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to substantially prejudice a party’s rights
Attorney Terry R. Bankert based in Flint Michigan. State Wide Divorce practice in mediation. For information about State Wide Family Law issues in your area go to http://www.dumpmyspouse.com/
At my web site there are many Family Law Articles to help you.
by Terry Ray Bankert a Flint Divorce Lawyer Attorney
KNOW YOUR CUSTODY,SUPPORT AND DIVORCE RIGHTS. Michigan Divorce Lawyer , Custody and support.
Friend of the Court mediation.
Must be provided for custody and parenting time disputes; optional use by the parties.
Court rule mediation.
The court may refer any contested issue to mediation, but parties who are subject to personal protection orders or who are involved in child abuse or neglect proceedings may not be referred to mediation without a hearing.
Referral to mediation—by stipulation, a party’s written motion, or the court’s own motion.
Objection to mediation—within 14 days after notice of an order assigning the matter to mediation, by motion and notice of a hearing. The motion must be heard within 14 days unless the court orders otherwise, but it must be heard before the case is submitted to mediation.
Private mediation.
On the parties’ stipulation, the court may order private mediation.
Arbitration.
The parties may agree in writing to resolve property, custody, and child support issues. Having agreed, the parties are bound by the decision. The court may vacate the award if
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means
there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights
the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers
the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to substantially prejudice a party’s rights
Attorney Terry R. Bankert based in Flint Michigan. State Wide Divorce practice in mediation. For information about State Wide Family Law issues in your area go to http://www.dumpmyspouse.com/
At my web site there are many Family Law Articles to help you.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Bay County
Bay County
http://www.baycounty-mi.gov/
515 Center AveSuite 405Bay City, MI 48708(989) 895-4120
Area: 444 smEst: 1857Pop: 110,157Pop/sm: 248.0Seat: Bay City
http://www.baycounty-mi.gov/
515 Center AveSuite 405Bay City, MI 48708(989) 895-4120
Area: 444 smEst: 1857Pop: 110,157Pop/sm: 248.0Seat: Bay City
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